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Abstract: We extend the analysis of van Damme (1987, Section 7.5) of the famous
smoothing demand in Nash (1953) as an argument for the singular stability of the
symmetric Nash bargaining solution among all Pareto efficient equilibria of the Nash
demand game. Van Damme’s analysis provides a clean mathematical framework where
he substantiates Nash’s conjecture by two fundamental theorems in which he proves
that the Nash solution is among all Nash equilibria of the Nash demand game the only
one that is H–essential. We show by generalizing this analysis that for any asymmetric
Nash bargaining solution a similar stability property can be established that we call
Hα–essentiality. A special case of our result for α = 1/2 is H1/2–essentiality that
coincides with van Damme’s H–essentiality. Our analysis deprives the symmetric
Nash solution equilibrium of Nash’s demand game of its exposed position and fortifies
our conviction that, in contrast to the predominant view in the related literature, the
only structural difference between the asymmetric Nash solutions and the symmetric
one is that the latter one is symmetric.
While our proofs are mathematically straightforward given the analysis of van Damme
(1987), our results change drastically the prevalent interpretation of Nash’s smoothing
of his demand game and dilute its conceptual importance.
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1 Introduction
In the abstract of Serrano in Homo Oeconomicus, Sixty-Seven Years of the Nash
Program: Time for Retirement? Roberto Serrano writes: “The program is thus
turning sixty-seven years old, but I will argue it is not ready for retirement, as it
is full of energy and one can still propose important directions to be explored.”
The last two passages in the introduction of Nash (1953) beginning with the sen-
tence: “We give two independent derivations of our solution of the two-person
cooperative game” are the origin of what is now called Nash program. The solu-
tion referred to here is the Nash bargaining solution.
After a description and formalization of his Negotiation Model, Nash provided
the object of our analysis by the following passage:
“What we have is actually a two move game. Stages two and four do not in-
volve any decisions by the players. The second move choices are made with full
information about what was done in the first move. Therefore, the game of the
second move alone may be considered separately (it is a game with a variable pay-
off function determined by the choices made at the first move) . . . The demand
game defined by these payoff functions will generally have an infinite number of
inequivalent equilibrium points. . . Thus the points do not lead us immediately to
a solution of the game. But if we discriminate between them by studying their
relative stabilities we can escape from this troublesome non–uniqueness.
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To do this we “smooth” the game to obtain a continuous payoff function and
then study the limiting behavior of the equilibrium points of the smoothed game
as the amount of smoothing approaches zero.
A certain general class of natural smoothing methods will be considered here.
This class is broader than one might at first think, for many other methods that
superficially seem different are actually equivalent.”
While Nash’s own analysis provides a clear picture of what he has in mind it
is lacking a complete formal model and a precise analysis that would result in
a mathematical theorem. Nevertheless, Luce and Raiffa write in Section 6.9 on
the Nash demand game:
“as Nash is well aware, there is in general a continuum of other inequivalent
equilibrium pairs [of payoffs].The weak link in the argument is to single out this
particular pair. Nash offers an ingenious and mathematically sound argument
for doing so, but we fail to see why it is relevant. Nash then shows that this
“solution” is the only necessary limit of the equilibrium points of smooth games.”
Several authors have later, despite some critical remarks, disagreed with this
statement regarding the relevance of Nash’s smoothing and also regarding the
mathematical soundness of Nash’s treatment, and have attempted to remedy
the deficiencies or to just give a concise presentation of Nash’s analysis. Despite
some small differences in their modellings they all confirm the stability.
Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) write in their Section 4.3.2: The Perturbed De-
mand Game: “Given that the notion of Nash equilibrium puts so few restrictions
on the nature of the outcome of a demand game, Nash considered a more discrim-
inating notion of equilibrium, which is related to Selten’s (1975) [trembling hand]
perfect equilibrium”. They confirm Nash in their Proposition 4.3. Other formal
treatments can be found in Binmore (1987, Section 4), van Damme (1987, Section
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7.5), Peters (1992, Section 9.3), Roemer (1998, Section 2.2). See also Carlsson
(1991), Kaneko (1981, Section 3) and Malueg (2010) for further comments on
Nash’s smoothing.
All these approaches follow Nash’s idea to define a family of disturbed games
where symmetry is already inherent. The families of perturbations of the simple
demand game are defined with the symmetric Nash product as the funda-
mental ingredient. Consideration of Figure 1 in Nash (1953) illustrates very well
that the perturbations are defined via the symmetric Nash product. From the
picture one cannot see any argument why analogous figures centered at asym-
metric Nash solution points should behave qualitatively differently!
It appears credible that the symmetric Nash solution is stable in the sense of
Nash. So the formal proofs are not surprising. What surprised us is that nobody
tried to check the stability of the other equilibria of the demand game. Only if
they would turn out not to be stable under similar criteria the exposed singu-
lar role of the symmetric Nash equilibrium, accepted without exception in the
literature, would be justified.
In this paper we are making the litmus test. After we had first looked for the
most convincing and rigorous treatment, we decided for van Damme (1987) and
Peters (1992). We choose van Damme (1987) which was earlier and had been
followed and quoted by Peters (1992). Hence, we will follow, also close in our
notation, the analysis in Section 7.5 of van Damme (1987). As he felt Nash’s
stability concept to be close to essentiality of equilibria as defined in Wu and
Jiang (1962) he called it H–essentiality. We will define for any α ∈ (0, 1) the
concept of Hα–essentiality, that coincides for α = 1/2 with van Damme’s H–
essentiality. We extend his Theorems 7.5.4 and 7.5.5 on H1/2–essentiality of the
symmetric Nash solution to Hα–essentiality of α–symmetric Nash solutions for
any α ∈ (0, 1). It is quite obvious that also the other quoted theorems in the
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literature can mutatis mutandis be extended in analogous ways.
2 Definitions
Our main object of analysis is the two-person cooperative bargaining game de-
fined and analyzed in detail in Nash (1950) and Nash (1953), respectively.
The compact convex subset S of R2 represents the two-player feasible payoff
vectors, the point d ∈ S is the status quo point that describes the players’ payoffs
in the case of disagreement about any other feasible x ∈ S. Like van Damme
(1987), we assume for convenience that S is d–comprehensive which means that
for any y ∈ S, we have that if x ∈ R2 with d ≤ x ≤ y, then x ∈ S.
Moreover, we assume wlog that (S, d) is (0, 1)–normalized, i.e., d = 0 and
max
x∈S
x1 = max
x∈S
x2 = 1. So (1, 1) is the utopia point of S. As S is convex set,
its efficient boundary ∂S is the graph of a continuous function f : [0, 1]→ [0, 1]
such that (x1, f(x1)) ∈ ∂S.
In this framework, we follow as far as possible van Damme (1987) in notation
and terminology. We fix some arbitrary α ∈ (0, 1), and consider wlog the case
α ≤ 1− α. We sometimes denote the bargaining game (S, 0) by S.
Let Γ be the Nash demand game associated with S and described by the following
rules: the players state their demands x1, x2 simultaneously and independently,
and if the demands are feasible, i.e., (x1, x2) ∈ S, then each player receives her
demand, otherwise each player receives her disagreement outcome of 0. Formally
speaking, Γ = (R2+,R2+, R1, R2) is the demand game where for all i, Ri(x1, x2) =
xiχS(x1, x2) in which χS denotes the characteristic function of S with χS(x) = 1
if x ∈ S, otherwise χS(x) = 0.
Our class Hα of perturbations of the characteristic function χS is defined in
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Definition 1.
Definition 1. Let Hα = ∪
>0
Hα be such that for all  > 0, H

α is the set of
functions satisfying
hα : R2+ −→ (0, 1] is continous, hα(x) = 1 for all x ∈ S and
max
{
hα(x), x
2α
1 x
2(1−α)
2 h

α(x)
}
<  if ρ(x, S) > ,
where ρ denotes the Euclidean distance between x and S.
Like in van Damme (1987), we collect functions which at points near to S still
take values close to 1, but then, as Nash (1950) had called it, ‘taper off very
rapidly towards zero’, as x moves away from S.
We define the disturbed game Γ(hα) = (R2+,R2+, Rα1 , R

α2
) with Rα1(x) =
x1(h

α(x))
1/2α and Rα2(x) = x2(h

α(x))
1/2(1−α). Notice that for α = 1/2 this
amounts to R(1/2)i(x) = xih

1/2(x) = R
h
i (x) as in van Damme’s framework.
Definition 2. An equilibrium x of Γ is called Hα-essential if for any (h

α)→0+
with hα ∈ H, there exists (xα)→0+ such that xα → x as  → 0 and xα is an
equilibrium of Γ(hα).
Let x∗α be the maximizer of x
α
1x
1−α
2 on S, i.e., the α–symmetric Nash solution of
the game (S, d) for the given α. Our first theorem generalizes Theorem 7.5.4 in
van Damme (1987).
Theorem 1. x∗α is an Hα-essential equilibrium of Γ.
Proof. Note that (x∗α1)
α(x∗α2)
1−α > 0 and that for hα ∈ Hα when  ∈
(0, (x∗α1)
2α(x∗α2)
2(1−α)), there exists a point x where by continuity of the function
x2α1 x
2(1−α)
2 h

α reaches its maxiumum. By the definition of H

α, we get ρ(x
, S) ≤ .
The maximality of x implies for all x1 ∈ R+, x2α1 (x2)2(1−α)hα(x1, x2) ≤
(x1)
2α(x2)
2(1−α)hα(x

1, x

2). By cancelling (x

2)
2(1−α) > 0, we get x2α1 h

α(x1, x

2) ≤
6
(x1)
2αhα(x

1, x

2), hence R

α1
(x1, x

2) ≤ Rα1(x) for all x1 ∈ R+. Similarly, one
derives Rα2(x

1, x2) ≤ Rα2(x) for all x2 ∈ R+. This establishes that x is an
equilibrium of Γ(hα).
Now, consider the (generalized) sequence (x). We get (x
∗
α1
)2α(x∗α2)
2(1−α) ≤
lim
→0
(x1)
2α(x2)
2(1−α), since (x∗α1)
2α(x∗α2)
2(1−α) = (x∗α1)
2α(x∗α2)
2(1−α)hα(x
∗
α) ≤
(x1)
2α(x2)
2(1−α)hα(x
) ≤ (x1)2α(x2)2(1−α). Moreover, lim
→0
(x1)
2α(x2)
2(1−α) ≤
(x∗α1)
2α(x∗α2)
2(1−α) since lim
→0
x ∈ ∂S. Thus, lim
→0
x = x∗α.
We describe the distance of a point x ∈ R2 outside S to S by the Minkowski
functional or gauge of S, denoted γS which is defined as γS : R2+ \ S → R+
where γS(x) = inf{t > 0 | x/t ∈ S}. As S is fixed in our analysis, we skip S
and denote this gauge γ. Since the set S is convex and closed with 0 ∈ S, the
function γ is continuous [cf. Aliprantis and Border (1994, Theorem 4.37)]. In
order to make the analysis simpler, we assume that the function f defined above
is differentiable. Then ∂S becomes smooth and γ differentiable on R2+ \ S due
to its positive linear homogeneity.
As for any x ∈ ∂S, we have f(x1/γ(x)) = x2/γ(x) and we get by partial differ-
entiation with respect to x1 and x2
f ′(x1/γ(x))(γ(x)− x1γ1(x)) = −x2γ1(x) (1)
f ′(x1/γ(x))x1γ2(x) = x2γ2(x)− γ(x), (2)
where γi(x) =
∂γ(x)
∂xi
for i = 1, 2.
By Eq. 1 and Eq. 2, one can derive in few steps
γ(x) = x1γ1(x) + x2γ2(x).
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Define
hα(x) =
1 if x ∈ S,e−(γ(x)−1)2/ otherwise.
Analogously to van Damme (1987), one can show that hα ∈ Hα for all  > 0.
Theorem 2. For  > 0, Γ(hα) has a unique equilibrium x
, and x → x∗α as
→ 0.
Proof. Clearly, an interior point of S cannot be an equilibrium point.
∂Rα1(x)/∂x1 = (h

α(x))
1/2α + x1(1/2α)(h

α(x))
−1+1/2α∂hα(x)/∂x1
= (hα(x))
1/2α[1− x1γ1(x)(γ(x)− 1)/α],
∂Rα2(x)/∂x2 = (h

α(x))
1/2(1−α) + x2(1/2(1− α))(hα(x))−1+1/2(1−α)∂hα(x)/∂x2
= (hα(x))
1/2(1−α)[1− x2γ2(x)(γ(x)− 1)/(1− α)].
If x ∈ ∂S, ∂Rαi (x)/∂xi = 1 for all i = 1, 2. So, an equilibrium point is not an
element of S. At the equilibrium point x∗, ∂Rαi (x
∗)/∂xi = 0 for all i = 1, 2. This
gives us
 = x1γ1(x)(γ(x)− 1)/α = x2γ2(x)(γ(x)− 1)/(1− α). (3)
By combining this with γ(x) = x1γ1(x) + x2γ2(x), we get
α(1− α)γ(x) = (1− α)x1γ1(x) = αx2γ2(x). (4)
Substituting Eq. 4 into Eq. 3 gives γ(x)(γ(x) − 1) = . Hence, γ(x) = (1 +
√
1 + 4)/2. Observe that γ(x)→ 1 as → 0.
Plugging Eq. 4 into Eq. 1 gives us
f ′(x1/γ(x)) = −α(1/γ(x))x2/(1− α)(1/γ(x))x1,
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by which we know that the point x/γ(x) ∈ ∂S satisfies f ′(x1) = −αx2/(1−α)x1.
Now, consider x∗α. It maximizes x
α
1x
1−α
2 = x
α
1f(x1)
1−α on S. By FOC, we easily
get f ′(x∗α1) = −αx∗α2/(1− α)x∗α1 . This shows that γ−1(x)x is the α–symmetric
Nash solution of (S, d). Hence, x = γ(x)x∗α is the unique equilibrium of Γ(h

α).
Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 established what we wanted to show: Every α–
symmetric Nash solution represents the unique Hα–essential equilibrium of the
Nash demand game. The (symmetric) Nash solution is not “more stable” than
any α–symmetric Nash solution.
3 Concluding Remarks
We have deprived in this article the symmetric Nash bargaining solution of its
exposed role as the unique H–essential (“stable”) equilibrium of Nash’s demand
game. In fact all equilibria of this game are Hα–essential for exactly one α ∈
(0, 1), but none is Hα–essential for more than one α ∈ (0, 1).
Despite the long history of belief in a special structural position of the symmetric
Nash solution, none of the other approaches to the Nash solutions give reason to
this view.
Anbar and Kalai (1978), Binmore et al. (1986), Trockel (1996, 2000), Duman
and Trockel (2016) present different non-cooperative support results for all α–
symmetric Nash solutions, with the symmetric one just as a special case, namely
α = 1/2. Any use of symmetry as a postulate like in the Nash axioms needs
some justification like equity, justice. For a Pareto based justification see Trockel
(2008).
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The similarity of H1/2–essentiality with the trembling hand perfectness of Selten
stressed in the literature like for instance in our above quotation from Osborne
and Rubinstein (1990) or in Kaneko (1981, p. 312) turned out now articulately
to be inadequate. While all efficient equilibria of Nash’s demand game share the
same types of stability (namely Hα–essentiality), this is not the case with a trem-
bling hand equilibrium that is inherently structurally different from non–perfect
equilibria. This fact is nicely demonstrated by the example of Chain Store Game
(see Selten (1978)), where only one of the two Nash equilibria is subgame perfect.
Although in Milgrom and Roberts (1982) and Kreps and Wilson (1982) in cer-
tain perturbations of the chain store game both pendants of Selten’s equilibria
are sequential only the (pendant of) the subgame equilibrium in Selten’s game
is even trembling hand perfect. ‡
Our results document a different direct analogy to Walrasian equilibria and their
efficiency. The well–known pendant of the First Welfare Theorem asserts that
every Nash equilibrium (except the utopia point of the underlying bargaining
problem) of the Nash demand game, hence in particular the H1/2–equilibrium,
is Pareto efficient.
In this article we have proven an analogue of the Second Welfare Theorem:
Every Pareto efficient payoff vector of the Nash demand game results from an
Hα-essential Nash equilibrium for some α ∈ (0, 1).
Analogous results, where prices rather than the alphas act as parameters, had
been proven in Trockel (1996) for (tatonnement–stable) Walrasian equilibria
rather than Hα-essential Nash equilibria.
‡In fact, in order to get sequentiality of both equilibria one does not need any perturbation
of the data of Selten’s game (see Trockel (1986), Duman (2020)).
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